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By this rejection of God, agnosticism has embraced complete relativism. Yet this relativism must furnish a basis for the rejection of the absolute. Accordingly, the standard of self-contradiction taken for granted by antitheistic thought presupposes the absolute for its operation. Antitheism presupposes theism. One must stand upon the solid ground of theism to be an effective antitheist.

(Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, p. xi)

“Antitheism presupposes theism” is one of Van Til’s best lines, because it captures in a nutshell the genius of presuppositional apologetics. It’s not merely that theism is true; it’s not merely that theism can be shown to be true; it’s that theism can be shown to be true by any attempt to prove it false. One can prove theism to be false only if, as a matter of fundamental metaphysical fact, theism is true — which is just to say that antitheism is self-defeating.

The paper I co-authored with Greg Welty gives one line of argument (there are others) in support of Van Til’s pithy and provocative slogan. As we conclude:

[I]f the laws of logic are metaphysically dependent on God, it follows that every logical argument presupposes the existence of God. What this means is that every sound theistic argument not only proves the existence of God but also presupposes the existence of God, insofar as that argument depends on logical inference. Indeed, every unsound theistic argument presupposes the existence of God. And the same goes, naturally, for every antitheistic argument. The irony must not be missed: one can logically argue against God only if God exists.

The last statement is really nothing more than a paraphrase of Van Til. Moreover, our paper sheds light on how one might understand the term ‘presupposes’ in Van Til’s famous statement. (I don’t claim that this is exactly how Van Til meant it, but I do claim that it’s consonant with his overall apologetic vision.) We have argued that the laws of logic should be understood as divine thoughts — more precisely, as divine thoughts about the essential relations between divine thoughts. Thus the relationship between God and the laws of logic is none other than the relationship between God and God’s thoughts.

On this view, ‘presupposes’ can be cashed out in terms of metaphysical preconditionality: X presupposes Y just in case Y is a metaphysical precondition of X; which is to say that X can be the case only if Y is the case (where Y pertains to some metaphysical state-of-affairs, e.g., the existence of a being with certain attributes). Clearly the existence of God is a metaphysical precondition of there being divine thoughts, just as the existence of humans is a precondition of there being human thoughts. In the absence of humans, there can be no human thoughts; in the absence of God, there can be no divine thoughts. So if we’re correct that the laws of logic must be divine thoughts, the existence of God is a metaphysical precondition of the laws of logic.

I take it that antitheism is more than just atheism. Atheism is simply the rejection of theism. (Some will want to distinguish between negative atheism — the absence of belief in God — and positive atheism — belief in the absence of God.) Antitheism, however, doesn’t merely deny theism; it opposes theism. And one of the ways it opposes theism is through argument. Antitheists oppose theism by arguing that belief in God is false, irrational, irresponsible, dangerous, and all the rest.

Insofar as logical argument depends on laws of logic, antitheism depends on laws of logic. Without laws of logic there could be no antitheism — at any rate, no logical antitheism. But if the existence of God is a metaphysical precondition of the laws of logic, it follows straightforwardly that the existence of God is a metaphysical precondition of antitheism. In other words: “Antitheism presupposes theism.”

One might think that a more modest, quasi-fideistic form of atheism escapes this sort of self-defeat. An atheist of this stripe might put it as follows: “I deny that theism is true, but I don’t think that the non-existence of God can be logically proven or argued. Since my atheism doesn’t depend on the laws of logic, it doesn’t presuppose theism, even if you’re right that the laws of logic presuppose theism.”

No doubt there are some such atheists, just as there are fideistic theists. But while their atheism may not depend on the laws of logic, they will surely rely on the laws of logic in other areas of life, whether they recognize it or not. In any case, it’s not clear that this weak atheism doesn’t depend on the laws of logic in other ways. (Consider, for example, the logical force of the word ‘since’ in the paragraph above.)

Let us suppose, however, that there could be an extraordinarily modest form of atheism that didn’t depend at all on the laws of logic. Could it avoid the sort of presuppositional refutation that Van Til had in mind? I think not. Consider the following reductio argument:

(1) God does not exist. [assumption for reductio]

(2) It is true that God does not exist. [from (1)]

(3) There is at least one truth (namely, the truth that there is no God). [from (2)]

(4) If there are truths, they are divine thoughts.

(5) There is at least one divine thought. [from (3) and (4)]

(6) If there are divine thoughts, then God exists.

(7) Therefore, God exists. [from (5) and (6)]

Obviously the most disputable premise in the argument is (4). So what good reason is there to accept it?

While our paper doesn’t explicitly argue for (4), it nonetheless suggests an indirect argument for it. We argue, in effect, that if there are necessary truths, they should be identified with divine thoughts. But what about contingent truths? Couldn’t the atheist maintain that (1) is a contingent truth and that contingent truths don’t have to be divine thoughts?

There are several problems with such a response. First, Plantinga’s modal ontological argument shows at least that if God possibly exists then God necessarily exists. It follows that the only coherent form of atheism is “Anselmian atheism”: if the claim that God exists is false then it must be necessarily false.

Secondly, and more generally, one’s theory of propositions shouldn’t be more ontologically complex than it needs to be. (Recall that we argue in the paper that truths are propositions, that is, primary truth-bearers.) Shouldn’t we expect all propositions to have the same metaphysical basis, regardless of their modality? It would be a strange theory of propositions which held that some propositions are divine thoughts while other propositions are something else altogether (e.g., human thoughts or brain-inscriptions).

Thirdly, and more decisively, one can argue from the claim that propositions are thoughts (a claim we defend in the paper) that contingent truths must also be divine thoughts. Assume that God’s decision to create was free and contingent, in which case there is a possible world in which there is no creation; a possible world in which only God exists. (For simplicity’s sake I’m ignoring theistic platonist schemes in which there are necessarily existent abstract objects distinct from God.) In that possible world, there is at least one contingent truth: the truth that God freely chose not to create. But if that truth — that true proposition — is a thought, it must be a divine thought (because the only mind is God’s mind). So both contingent and necessary truths — in other words, all truths — should be identified with divine thoughts.

Finally, we can argue that if there are contingent truths, there must also be necessary truths. According to the most intuitive and widely accepted system of modal logic (S5) the modal status of a proposition is the same in every possible world, thus whatever is contingent is necessarily contingent. So for every contingent truth P there is a corresponding necessary truth, namely, that P is not a necessary truth. (There are other arguments in the neighborhood: e.g., for every truth P there is a corresponding necessary truth, namely, that P is either contingently true or necessarily true.)

It therefore appears that any form of atheism that denies the existence of God must presuppose the existence of God. But what about the agnostic, who rejects both theism and atheism? It’s not difficult to see how the argument above can be adapted so as to defeat agnosticism on the same basis:

(1′) I don’t know whether or not God exists.

(2′) It is true that I don’t know whether or not God exists. [from (1')]

(3′) There is at least one truth (namely, the truth that I don’t know whether or not God exists). [from (2')]

(4) If there are truths, they are divine thoughts.

(5) Therefore, there is at least one divine thought. [from (3') and (4)]

(6) If there are divine thoughts, then God exists.

(7) Therefore, God exists.

Moreover, even if the agnostic affirms neither atheism nor theism, he should at least accept that theism is either true or false: either God exists or God does not exist. But then the same line of argument can be launched from that premise (which, we should note, is a necessary truth):

(1”) Either God exists or God does not exist.

(2”) It is true that either God exists or God does not exist. [from (1'')]

(3”) There is at least one truth (namely, the truth that either God exists or God does not exist). [from (2'')]

(4) If there are truths, they are divine thoughts.

(5) Therefore, there is at least one divine thought. [from (3'') and (4)]

(6) If there are divine thoughts, then God exists.

(7) Therefore, God exists.

So we can see that antitheism, atheism, and agnosticism all presuppose theism, if the argument that necessary truths are divine thoughts is sound. In fact, it ought to be clear by now that by the same underlying argument we can show that any ‘ism’ presupposes theism. God’s existence is presupposed by any philosophy, ideology, or belief-system that is committed to at least one truth (whether explicitly or implicitly; even nihilism is implicitly committed to the truth of nihilism).

This leads neatly to another of my favorite Van Til quotes:

It is the firm conviction of every epistemologically self-conscious Christian that no human being can utter a single syllable, whether in negation or affirmation, unless it were for God’s existence. Thus the transcendental argument seeks to discover what sort of foundations the house of human knowledge must have, in order to be what it is.

(Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, p. 11)

In this post I have suggested one way in which the core contention of Van Til’s transcendental presuppositionalism can be defended. Both negation and affirmation involve propositions: to affirm is to ascribe truth to a proposition; to negate is to ascribe falsity to a proposition. Without propositions, then, there can be neither affirmations nor negations. And if propositions are none other than divine thoughts, it follows that both affirmation and negation presuppose the existence of God. Without God there could be neither affirmation nor negation, neither argument nor knowledge.

Of course, I have assumed here that the core argument of our paper is cogent. My purpose in this post has not been to defend that argument, but merely to show how its conclusions can be deployed in support of some of Van Til’s most distinctive claims.

Here’s the abstract:

In this paper we offer a new argument for the existence of God. We contend that the laws of logic are metaphysically dependent on the existence of God, understood as a necessarily existent, personal, spiritual being; thus anyone who grants that there are laws of logic should also accept that there is a God. We argue that if our most natural intuitions about them are correct, and if they’re to play the role in our intellectual activities that we take them to play, then the laws of logic are best construed as necessarily existent thoughts — more specifically, as divine thoughts about divine thoughts. We conclude by highlighting some implications for both theistic arguments and antitheistic arguments.

While we don’t discuss Van Til or presuppositional apologetics in the paper, those so inclined will recognize this as a more robust exposition of a common presuppositionalist argument and they’ll also appreciate (I hope) the concluding remarks.

Dawkins’ piece reflects his trademark rhetorical devices — condescension, mockery, faux outrage, and a dash or two of genuine wit — but what stuck me most was the complete absence of any moral categories in his criticism of Craig and his views. Dawkins regards Craig’s views as ‘horrific’, ‘revolting’, ‘shocking’, and ‘deplorable’. But none of these descriptors function as objective moral evaluations of Craig or Craig’s God. In reality, they reflect little more than Dawkins’ feelings about Craig and Craig’s God (and the feelings of those who share Dawkins’ jaundiced outlook on the world).

I suppose this shouldn’t be surprising, given Dawkins’ published views on the nature of morality. For example, in The God Delusion he rejected and ridiculed the notion that there are moral absolutes. But if there are no moral absolutes, then there are no moral principles that absolutely rule out genocide. According to Dawkins’ moral outlook, then, genocide could be morally justified in some circumstances — just as late-term abortion is morally justified in some circumstances (as Dawkins apparently believes). Isn’t it therefore an open question whether the Old Testament ‘genocides’ were morally justified given the circumstances? Given Dawkins’ own premises, isn’t that question at least worthy of… debate? (I should state for the record that I don’t believe the destruction of the Canaanites was an instance of genocide; I’m just granting Dawkins’ characterization for the sake of argument.)

In the end, all Dawkins has really told us is that he won’t debate Craig because he finds Craig’s views personally offensive. It’s not that Craig’s views are unethical; it’s not that they’re immoral; it’s certainly not that they’re wicked or evil. It’s just that Dawkins finds them extremely distasteful. Dawkins is disgusted — and that’s all there is to it. Even if that were the real reason for his refusal to debate Craig, it would hardly be a compelling one. The only virtue of Dawkins’ dubious explanation, if it can be called a virtue, is its consistency with his moral nihilism.

Update: Here are some entertaining commentaries on Dawkins’ piece:

• “Richard Dawkins’s refusal to debate is cynical and anti-intellectualist” (Daniel Came)
• “Richard Dawkins’s Delicacy” (James Barham)
• “Richard Dawkins for Prime Minister” (Dominic Bnonn Tennant)
• “Why Craig Won’t Debate Dawkins: An Unofficial Official Statement” (Paul Manata)

To grant that marriage could be redefined is to capitulate to a postmodernist anti-realism according to which all social structures and institutions are mere human conventions and there is really no such thing as human nature, understood in traditional metaphysical terms. We must insist that marriage is not something that can be defined and redefined as we see fit. Marriage is a divine institution, not a human social construction like chess or money that we invented for our own purposes. There wasn’t a point in time at which humans ‘defined’ marriage in the way that, say, a foot was once defined as 12 inches. Marriage was bestowed upon us, not created by us.

If the traditional view of marriage is correct then the idea that we could redefine marriage to include same-sex partnerships is on a par with the idea that we could redefine elephants to include hippopotamuses. Only the most deluded postmodernist would say that elephants were defined by humans. (Don’t make the mistake here of confusing elephants with the English word ‘elephant’. Words don’t have trunks and tusks.) But of course, we humans didn’t define humans any more than we defined elephants. To think otherwise would be to put the cart before… well, the cart. And if marriage is grounded in the very nature of human beings, as the traditional view maintains, then we humans didn’t define marriage any more than we defined ourselves. Nor are we in any position whatsoever to redefine marriage. It simply can’t be done — and Christians, along with other traditionalists, should be quick to point out the presumption and absurdity of claims to the contrary.

The very fact that these consultations have been launched in the first place, never mind their final outcomes, reveals just how deeply Western culture has sunk into the mire of postmodernism.

Apologies to Randal Rauser, whose first name I managed to misspell. (It was an ‘L’ of a mistake to make!) I’m told the error will be corrected the next time the AD site is updated.

A God without wrath brought men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross.

Seven decades later, some Dutch clergy are taking it to the next logical level: a God without existence brings men without beliefs into a kingdom without hope through the ministrations of a Christ without a life.

What would have functioned as a parody of liberalism a generation or two ago is now a tragic, pathetic reality. Abraham Kuyper must be spinning in his grave.

Thankfully there are still many thousands in the Netherlands who have not bowed the knee. Pray for them — and for revival in their homeland.

Here’s hoping that survival of the fittest operates at the theological level!